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Positive Moral Emotions and Moral Identity Development:
The Difference between Authentic and Hubristic Pride

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
Master of Arts in Developmental Psychology

Wilfrid Laurier University

Abstract

The goal of this study was to begin to fill a gap in the research on moral identity development in adolescence by investigating positive moral emotions (i.e., pride) for motivation in moral action in relation to moral identity development. Specifically, two forms of pride were analyzed: *authentic pride*, which is focussed on an action and its positive outcomes, and *hubristic pride*, which is focussed on an individual's performance that reflects their greater capability in comparison to others. A new pride measure was developed for use in this study. Ten scenarios depicting moral behaviour were used, with eleven statements representing authentic or hubristic pride. Based on a pilot study using 59 undergraduate students, factor analyses showed strong reliability in the statements' representation of two distinct facets of pride: authentic and hubristic.

Based on a sample of 216 adolescents (98 Grade 10 students, 118 undergraduate students) it was initially found that authentic and hubristic pride are, in fact, positively related. Subsequently, as predicted by previous research, authentic pride was strongly related to guilt, whereas hubristic pride was strongly associated with narcissism. Authentic pride was also found to be more strongly associated with aspects of internalization (moral identity internalization and internal moral motivation), with hubristic pride being more strongly associated with features of externalization (moral identity symbolization and external moral motivation). Most importantly, analyses showed that these associations become much stronger when controlling for individual facets of pride. Overall, the findings call for a differentiation between authentic and hubristic pride when studying moral emotion and/or moral behaviour. In addition, the importance of discussing the role of positive moral emotions in moral identity development and motivation for moral behaviour from early adolescence to adulthood is highlighted.

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Positive Moral Emotions and Moral Identity Development: The Difference between Authentic and Hubristic Pride

What is the nature of moral identity? How can we explain behaviour and motivation in terms of one's moral compass? In an attempt to accurately answer these questions, researchers have studied various facets of the moral self (i.e., motivation, emotion, values) with the goal of differentiating these parts and subsequently integrating them into a useful definition of moral identity. One of the main goals in studying moral development is to fully understand the relationship between morality and action, behavior, and motivation. In order to do so, we must first understand what moral identity is, and the role that it plays in guiding behaviour. The following sections will outline how moral identity is currently understood, as well as the relationship between moral identity and behaviour, motivation, and emotion. The importance of the distinction made initially by Tracy and Robins (2004) between the two facets of the positive moral emotion of pride, authentic versus hubristic, will be discussed in its relation to moral behaviour. Specifically, the predictive qualities of moral identity and moral motivation in relation to feelings of authentic and hubristic pride will be deliberated and analyzed.

Moral Identity

The development of moral identity is an important part of positive child and youth development (e.g., Damon, 2004; 2006). Some evidence suggests that there are early signs of moral development present in children (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). For instance, Kochanska (2002) found that as children start to either obey or disregard the rules of their parents they subsequently begin to think of themselves as either 'good' or 'bad'. Affective responses to moral action have also been found to be present in early childhood, between 14 and 45 months of age (Kochanska, 2002). Using puppet interviews, Campbell (2012) recently found

that children between the ages of 8 and 11 years old actually have a moral self-concept that reflects preferences for prosocial behaviour and avoidance of antisocial behaviour. In addition, in a study on the role of shyness, aggression, and parent-child relationship in children's moral self-concept, Sengsavang (in press) found that higher levels of shyness are associated with lower levels of participating in prosocial behaviour and lower self-concept scores, as well as that higher levels of aggression are related to less prosocial behaviour and lower self-concept scores. This leads us to believe that not only is the development of the moral self important in childhood, but there are also risk factors associated with shyness and aggression in children that highlight the importance of examining the role of constructs like these in moral development.

Although some features of moral development (e.g., obeying rules and emotional responses to behaviour) have been observed during childhood, no research has connected these processes to development in adolescence, nor has it concretely verified that the majority of moral development occurs this early in life. Children tend to lack important perspective-taking skills and place much less importance on morality, limiting their ability to develop strong moral identities (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Not surprisingly, the bulk of identity formation and moral development has in fact been found to occur during adolescence (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Kohlberg, 1969; Thompson, 2009). Significant increases in maturity and the understanding of moral norms during adolescence helps set the stage for this integration of morality and identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Adolescents also experience a higher growth in social interaction with peers compared to children, which leads to increased awareness and consideration for the perspectives and attitudes of others (Carlo, 2006). This surge in social interaction during adolescence aids in the development of self-understanding at this age, as many aspects of social interaction (e.g., treating others the way you want to be treated; being kind) represent culturally

relevant moral norms and ideals that become personally important to individuals during this time. (Damon & Hart, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2011).

The development of the relationship between morality and identity during adolescence is also representative of the growth in agency and responsibility during this time (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Although children may have a basic understanding of right and wrong, the judgment of responsibility during childhood is not as advanced as it is during the adolescent period (Blasi, 1983). When individuals reach adolescence, they begin to make judgments about their actions and take responsibility for their behaviour. The limited incorporation of morality into identity in children also explains why they tend to be much more externally motivated (e.g., focussed on punishment and reward) compared to adolescents, who place more emphasis on internal cues such as personally-relevant and important moral standards (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). This increase in development and the merging of both identity and morality during adolescence may be explained by increased perspective-taking, problem solving, and interpersonal negotiation skill maturation (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 2005), as moral judgments and prosocial behaviour (e.g., helping, sharing) are connected both conceptually and empirically to these perspective-taking skills (Eisenberg, 1986). In addition, the advancement of problem-solving and negotiation skills contribute to adolescents understanding of concern for others in social interactions, as well as helps to increase prosocial behaviour (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Selman 1980). Because of its role during such an influential and vulnerable developmental time period, the concept of moral identity has been conceptualized as building on Kohlberg's (1969) Cognitive Developmental Theory (based on moral reasoning) and expanding already existing identity theories.

Although research on moral identity development to this day is rather speculative in the sense that there are a variety of perspectives attempting to define moral identity, studies have shown that moral identity development occurs when moral development and identity formation intersect and, to this end, many argue that the formation of moral identity results from a fusion of an individual's sense of identity with moral values (e.g., Bergman, 2004; Damon, 1984; Hart, 2005; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). In fact, many researchers posit that moral identity results from both moral and identity advancement due to the similarity of their developmental trajectories (Blasi, 1993; Damon & Hart, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Simply, moral identity has been defined and understood as “the degree to which being a moral person is important to an individual's identity” (Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 212).

It has been found, as would be expected, that this integration of morality and identity is congruent with the development of beliefs, values, and attitudes that individuals have decided are important and central to their sense of self (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy 2006). Aquino and Reed (2002) suggested that the integration of moral values into one's identity is made up of two parts: internalization and symbolization. Whereas internalization refers to the degree to which moral traits are central to one's sense of self, symbolization represents the extent to which one displays their social identity as being based on moral characteristics (Aquino & Reed, 2002). As a result, one might be said to have a strong moral identity if highly moral beliefs and values are central to their identity; on the contrary, individuals may be considered to have a weak moral identity if they hold values and beliefs that are not necessarily moral in nature (Blasi, 1995; Hardy 2006). A strong representation of the connection between values/beliefs and moral identity lies within the literature on moral exemplars. In a study on the personality of brave and caring moral exemplars, Walker and Frimer (2007) not only found that the personalities of caring

moral exemplars were more nurturing, generative, and optimistic, but also that moral exemplars (in comparison to other participants not nominated for awards of exceptional bravery or caring) showed more integration of both agency and communion, more redemptive qualities in life stories, and also reported more secure attachments. These results represent a character perspective of moral identity, which identifies moral identity in terms of individual differences among traits/characteristics, and the degree to which morally relevant traits are central to an individual's identity and congruent with one's beliefs and values (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Blasi (1984) suggests that although not all traits are overlapping, there appears to be a set of common traits that individuals with strong moral identities share (such as agency and communion). Much of our understanding of moral identity from this perspective has in fact stemmed from the Self Model developed by Blasi (1980).

Blasi (1983) analyzed the influence of individuals' moral identity on decision-making in moral action. Specifically, he developed the Self-Model which focuses on moral identity as the mediating construct in the relationship between moral judgement and moral action (Damon 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). It has been suggested that moral self-integration (moral judgement and moral responsibility) is crucial in determining moral action (Blasi, 1983). Blasi argued that before moral action, moral judgement must occur – individuals must conclude that it is their personal responsibility to act (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Thus, people who conceive themselves, their values, and their goals as moral will act in accordance with these judgements, and subsequently view it as their duty or responsibility to act in moral ways (Damon, 2006). The criteria for such judgements of responsibility, Blasi suggested, stems from moral identity. However, because of the existence of individual differences in the degree to which being moral is central to one's identity, feelings of responsibility to act will differ from person-to-person

(Damon 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). In an attempt to provide support for this view, Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, and Riches (2011) conducted a study on the integration of agency and communion in moral personalities. Defining agency as “advancing the self relative to others” and communion as “advancing others relative to the self” (Frimer et. al., 2011, p. 150), moral exemplars (those who received an award for exceptional volunteerism) were matched with comparison participants (who did not receive awards). It was found that moral exemplars showed more agency and communion, and were also more likely to integrate these two features into their identity. This provides clear evidence for Blasi’s (1983) Self-Model, that individuals characterized by strong moral identities (central moral traits such as agency and communion) are more likely to make judgements of responsibility (for example, to help someone in need).

Blasi (1983) also argued that individuals strive for self-consistency – the human inclination to ensure that actions match the self system. Simply put, he argued that if individuals have a strong moral identity (that is, moral values and beliefs are central to them) they are likely to act in accordance with these values. Thus, Blasi theorized that moral self-integration results in moral judgements and moral responsibility, which in turn leads to moral action (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). However, recent research suggests that the term ‘moral self-integration’ is much too broad and can be used to represent two very different, yet meaningfully related, concepts. In his study on the dichotomy of the moral self (the moral self being made up of two constructs), Krettenauer (2011) argued that moral self-integration can refer to two constructs: 1) *moral centrality*, referring to how important or central moral values and beliefs are to an individual’s sense of self (i.e., moral identity)., and 2) *moral motivation*, which refers to the different reasons for why individuals do the things that they do. Krettenauer (2011) found that it is important to distinguish between moral centrality and moral motivation when assessing moral action, as these

constructs do not necessarily go hand-in-hand – one can have a strong moral centrality but be externally motivated (e.g., reward/punishment) to act, and vice-versa. Although these concepts have been shown to overlap, they have also been found to contribute separately to responsibility-taking and interact with one another to predict moral emotion expectancies (Krettenauer, 2011).

In addition to moral self-integration, schemas also play a vital role in the development of moral identity, as well as contributing to moral action (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Schemas are defined as cognitive knowledge structures that represent aspects of the self, others, the world, and our experiences (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Fiske, 2000; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). An individual's moral identity is understood to contain an aspect of morally relevant schemas that are accessible and used when processing situational information (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). However, comparable to trait-like theories, there are individual differences in moral schemas and the degree to which they are important and accessible (Aquino et. al., 2009). Individuals can be said to have strong moral identities if they have morally relevant schemas, if these schemas are highly accessible, and if they are extensively used in guiding action. This may be the case for moral exemplars, who portray a high level of moral expertise. That is, their accessibility to moral schemas allows for quick reactions and certainty in decisions to act morally in various situations (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004).

Moral schemas appear to be a critical part of moral identity development and moral behaviour. The major role that moral self-schemas play in determining moral behaviour indicates that moral identity development must entail an aspect of building and maintaining these moral schemas (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). We begin to understand what it means to be 'moral' and cultivate our image of what a moral person should be through experiences as we develop. It can

be said then, that an individual's ideal of what it means to be moral rests on cognitive advancement and social learning (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Hart, 2005). It is speculated that children have fewer and less advanced moral schemas, and limited availability of moral schemas, compared to adolescents due to a lack of social learning and experiences (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Consequently, children have limited ability to consistently demonstrate moral action in situations that call for such behaviour (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). As previously mentioned, Eisenberg et. al. (2005) has found evidence suggesting that the surge of prosocial behaviour during adolescence is attributable to the increase in, and refinement of, social and interpersonal skills.

Moral Behaviour

“Moral action has been viewed as either the immediate result of action tendencies and of their interplay or as mediated by such cognitive processes as moral definitions, moral beliefs, and moral reasoning” (Blasi, 1980, pp. 2). According to the first part of this statement, each individual has a set of general dispositions and traits that, when elicited, result in a specific action (Blasi, 1980). In this case, an individual with highly moral tendencies and values will likely engage in more instances of moral action. This appears to be the most prevalent view on moral action/behaviour today. According to this model, specific emphasis is placed on the cognitive processes involved in moral action, as cognitions are what moderate the relationship between situations and moral behaviour (Blasi, 1980). These cognitive processes can include moral beliefs, moral reasoning, moral judgments, and moral identity.

Moral identity has been shown to be of great importance for everyday moral functioning, especially when examining moral action (Aquino, et. al, 2011). Social-cognitive theorists have argued that there is a relationship between situational factors and moral identity, which subsequently influences moral action. For example, Walker and Frimer (2007) found that the

personalities of caring moral exemplars (those committed to caring for others) were more nurturing, generative, and optimistic than those of brave moral exemplars (those who have risked their lives to save others). They concluded that the difference in personality traits could be accounted for by the highly divergent situations that each type of moral exemplar experiences. Consequently, there may be a significant interaction between personality and situational factors on behaviour (Aquino et. al., 2009; Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Walker & Frimer, 2007). Extending this notion, Aquino et. al. (2009) proposed a model in which both situational factors and centrality of moral identity interact to influence moral behaviour. According to this framework, moral action/behaviour is the result of 1) an individual's centrality of moral identity, and 2) the extent to which situational factors trigger, and make more easily accessible, moral self-schemas (Aquino et. al., 2009). In their study, Aquino et. al. (2009) did in fact find evidence for their model – when an individual's moral self-schema is activated by situational factors, the likelihood of acting morally increases. However, this relationship became attenuated when participants' achievement-orientation was increased (by offering a financial incentive), which subsequently decreased access to moral identity (and prosocial behaviour) (Aquino et. al., 2009). They explained that moral primes and self-interest factors interact with moral identity centrality in order to produce behaviour (Aquino et. al., 2009).

Researchers have often viewed moral identity as the most important mechanism in motivating moral action (e.g. Blasi, 1984; Damon & Hart, 1992). In support of this conviction, Aquino & Reed (2002) conducted a study on the self-importance of moral identity, for which the goal was to determine the significance of moral identity and its role in predicting behavior. The results of this study indicate that moral identity, in relation to one's social identity and self-concept, is highly relevant in contributing to moral action and behaviour (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

In addition, numerous studies have examined the relationship between moral identity and moral action, focussing on aforementioned morality identity constructs such as moral schemas (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), traits, and self consistency (Blasi, 1984). In their study on prosocial behaviour and caring in adolescence, Hart & Fegley (1995) found that adolescent care moral exemplars were more likely to describe themselves using moral personality traits and morally relevant goals, as well as showing increased efforts to limit the discrepancy between their ideal selves and their actual selves, compared to other adolescents. This result was attributed to the notion that moral exemplars have social cognitive skills made up of a strong understanding of the self, others, and organizations that affect the relationship between the self and others (Hart & Fegley, 1995). Specifically, their self-descriptions (characteristics that make up the self-concept) match their self-evaluations and behaviours – if these do not match, behaviours will not be reflective of characteristics that are moral in nature. In this case the actual self and the ideal self of the moral exemplars are in conjunction with each other – their actual selves (who they are now) already contains aspects of their ideal self (who they strive to be). A disjointed relationship between the actual self and ideal self is less influential on behaviour compared to when they are matching each other. (Hart & Fegley, 1995). Colby & Damon (1992), in their study focussing on adult moral exemplars, also determined that morality was at the center of these individuals' identity (i.e., their desires matched what they believed to be right), and that the centrality of moral identity is what guides moral exemplars' commitment to moral action. Although studying moral exemplars has provided useful insight into the role of moral identity in moral behaviour, the exact relationship between moral identity and moral action is far from being fully understood and research on moral identity has just begun to unravel the many complexities around this concept (Hardy & Carlo, 2011).

Moral Emotions

Moral identity is not only associated with moral action, but also strongly related to moral emotions. Moral emotions provide a source of motivation, to do good or avoid bad, which is reflected in moral action (Blasi, 1999; Kroll & Egan, 2004; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Although different psychological perspectives use varying definitions of emotion, Blasi (1999) argued that three generalizations can be made that have common links among these perspectives: 1) emotions are accompanied by physiological processes, giving them their involuntary nature; 2) emotions act as a source of, or result of, motivation; and 3) emotions are affected by regulatory processes, which occur unconsciously.

The role of emotions in predicting moral action can be described using two models – one trait based and one arousal based. In the first model, emotions are seen as tied to various other sources of motivation, such as goals, beliefs, and drives (Blasi, 1999; Lazarus, 1991). Here, emotions are what connect these other sources of motivation to the environment. In this case, emotions provide motivation to attain set needs/goals/drives when the situation provides an appropriate and nurturing environment to do so (Blasi, 1999). An individual with morally relevant goals and beliefs who is emotionally motivated would be likely to produce moral action in order to attain these goals. In the latter model, emotions are defined as extreme levels of arousal, which guide behaviour in order to reduce arousal to its optimal level (Blasi, 1999; Mowrer, 1960). In this case, emotion is viewed as motivation to act in an attempt to reduce discomfort created by increased arousal with the goal of maintaining homeostasis. Although these models present two different approaches to emotion as motivation, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In both of these models the predictive quality of emotions in determining behaviour is reliant on other motivational processes (i.e., maintaining homeostasis, achieving

goals) (Blasi, 1999). In addition, both models represent emotion as the cause of behaviour, such that they automatically produce behaviour rather than leading to deliberate, intentional reasoning (Blasi, 1999).

Moral emotions also serve as moderators of the relationship between moral standards and moral behaviour (Tangney et. al., 2007). According to Tangney et. al. (2007), moral emotions may be one of the, if not the most, critical part in understanding adherence to moral standards. Emotions serve as the primary source of moral motivation, which leads to moral action (Hoffman, 2000). Evidence for this relationship has been provided by studies focussing on anti- and pro-social behaviour. In a meta-analysis, Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found that overall there is a positive relationship between empathy and prosocial behaviour throughout the lifespan. Johnston and Krettenauer (2011), as well as Krettenauer and Eichler (2006), also reported an association between moral emotion expectancies and antisocial/delinquent behaviour. In their study on the role of emotion expectancies, Krettenauer, Jia, and Mosleh (2010) provide evidence for the relationship between moral emotions and moral behaviour. They found that negative emotion expectancies (e.g., guilt) in violating a moral standard were the strongest predictors of moral decision-making in antisocial contexts, whereas positive emotion expectancies (e.g. pride) are the strongest in predicting moral decision-making in prosocial situations.

In a meta-analysis of 42 studies, Malti and Krettenauer (2013) examined the relationship between moral emotion attributions and prosocial versus antisocial behaviour. In order to outline the exact relationship between moral emotion attributions and behaviour, they aimed to examine how these moral emotion attributions relate to behaviour at different developmental stages. Results showed a strong association between moral emotion attributions and prosocial and antisocial behaviour, supporting the theory that moral emotion attributions (i.e. sadness, guilt)

play a significant part in determining the moral behaviour of children and adolescents (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). Interestingly, in accordance with findings produced by Krettenauer and Johnston (2011), the effect sizes for this relationship were found to be much larger for antisocial behaviour than they were for prosocial behaviour, suggesting that negative moral emotion attributions are stronger when individuals are engaged in actual antisocial behaviour compared to when one ceases to act in a prosocial manner. However, they found that age was not a significant moderator of the relationship between moral emotion attributions and behaviour, proposing that perhaps moral emotion attributions represent more of an individual difference rather than a result of cognitive development.

On the other hand, in their longitudinal study on the association between moral emotion expectancies and moral decision-making of 15 to 21 year olds, Krettenauer, Colasante, Buchman, and Malti (2012) aimed to investigate the development of moral decision-making and moral emotions from adolescence into early adulthood. Specifically, they looked at moral emotion expectancies and the happy-victimizer response (experiencing positive feelings after a moral transgression). When discussing the happy-victimizer phenomenon in this study, focus was put on the anticipatory function of emotion expectancies in moral decision-making contexts. Participants were presented with two moral dilemmas, after which they were asked what they would do in that situation (moral decision-making), how they would feel about doing it (emotion expectancy), and why they would do it/why they would feel this way (justification). Results showed a decrease in both the happy-victimizer response patterns and negative feelings following a moral transgression. They suggested that these findings can be attributed to age-related changes in decision-making (i.e., increasing during adolescence) rather than simply to individual differences in emotional attributions. This finding also supports the highly accepted

theoretical proposition that the development of moral identity increases during adolescence. This age-related change in the increase of positive emotions, as well as the decrease in the happy-victimizer response, can be attributed to moral identity development during adolescence.

It is important to note that the majority of research conducted on moral emotions has focussed on ‘self-conscious emotions’ – emotions that require understanding and evaluation of the self, such as guilt, shame, and embarrassment (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney et. al., 2007). Specifically, shame and guilt have been shown to encompass an appraisal of responsibility, as well as regret for violating a moral standard (Eisenberg, 2000). As such, they are regarded as consequential emotions – the self-conscious moral emotions that provide immediate feedback (reinforcement or punishment) after behaviour (Tangney et. al., 2007). However, individuals can also anticipate the emotions that they are likely to experience when decision-making regarding behaviour arises (Tangney et. al., 2007). Therefore, the self-conscious moral emotions of shame and guilt can affect behaviour in two ways: 1) providing anticipatory feedback regarding possible behaviour, and 2) providing immediate feedback after actual behaviour (Tangney et. al., 2007).

Tangney (1990) has also inferred the importance of dispositional tendencies rather than situation-specific emotions. Emotion disposition is understood as the tendency to experience an emotion across a variety of different situations (Tangney, 1990). Thus, an individual who has an emotion disposition towards guilt will be more likely to experience guilt in both anticipating behaviour and as a consequence of behaviour. Lewis (2000) proposed specific appraisal processes that serve as predictors of guilt and shame, as well as pride. He maintained that guilt results from an action that is inconsistent with an individual’s values and goals, whereas more

positive emotions, such as pride, result from an action that is congruent with an individual's values and goals (see also Tracy & Robins, 2004).

The predictive effect of moral emotions on behaviour is partly due to the mediating role of moral emotions in linking moral identity with behaviour (Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011). According to Tracy and Robins (2004), an individual's goals, beliefs, and values must be central to one's identity in order to produce self-evaluative emotions. Thus, emotions help us decide which self-relevant aspects of the environment are worth acting upon (Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011). Nunner-Winkle, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab (2007) found a significant correlation between moral emotion attributions and the self-importance of moral values as a measure of moral motivation. In order to replicate previous findings, Johnston and Krettenauer (2011) completed a study on the moral self and moral emotion expectancies in predicting anti- and pro-social behaviour. Results showed that adolescents who expected to feel less negative in hypothetical moral transgression scenarios reported more antisocial behaviour. In addition, they found evidence that the self-importance of moral values (i.e., level of moral identity) is related to prosocial behaviour in adolescence.

One issue that becomes pertinent here is the understanding of positive moral emotions. Much of the work on the relationship between moral identity, moral emotion, and moral action has been focussed on negative moral emotions (i.e., shame and guilt), while positive moral emotions (i.e., pride) have been neglected (e.g., Lewis, 2000; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010). Pride is considered a self-conscious emotion, much like shame and guilt, because it requires self-evaluation and self-awareness (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy et. al., 2010). Tracy and Robins (2004) have suggested that pride plays an extremely important role in psychological functioning, including reinforcing prosocial behaviour and the preservation of self-esteem. In support of this

notion, studies have shown that pride reinforces positive behaviours such as altruism and achievement (Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Weiner, 1985); and on the other hand, a lack of pride has been found to be associated with aggression and antisocial behaviour (Bushman & Baumeister, 1988). In addition, pride may also serve as an adaptive function, contributing to the notion that it could possibly be considered a basic emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2007). For example, pride may be an important emotion that reinforces and boosts behaviour, such as moral action. However, it is imperative that more research begins to focus on the role of pride in positive development and, in particular, in understanding moral behaviour.

In their study on moral emotion expectations in adolescence, Krettenauer and Johnston (2011) analyzed the relationship between expectations of guilt (i.e., negative emotions), pride (i.e., positive emotions) and the self-importance of moral values (i.e., moral identity). They found an asymmetrical relation between moral identity development in adolescence and negatively versus positively charged moral emotions. Specifically, a strong relationship was found between adolescent's moral identity and negative emotions (i.e., guilt/shame), whereas the association between moral identity and positive emotions (i.e., pride) was significantly weaker. This attenuated relationship may be due to the fact that pride can either be *authentic* or *hubristic* in nature (cf. Tracy & Robins, 2007). Tracy and Robins (2007) suggested that pride has both adaptive (e.g., maintaining achievement orientation) and maladaptive functions (e.g., aggression, hostility), which highlights the importance of the distinction between authentic and hubristic pride. Authentic pride, which has a more adaptive and socially desirable function, results from specific accomplishments and attributions that are internal, unstable, and controllable (i.e., effort) (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Hubristic pride on the other hand, which produces more maladaptive outcomes, is less focussed on actual accomplishments and reflects a much less genuine sense of

self (grandeur self-views) as a result of internal, stable, and uncontrollable attributions (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

Authentic and Hubristic Pride

Much research has been conducted with results supporting the theory of the existence of two facets of pride: authentic and hubristic (Lewis, 2000; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy et. al., 2010). In an attempt to differentiate between the two, Tracy & Robins (2007) asked participants to pair pride-related words, as well as to state what emotion is being depicted by an individual in a photo. Results provided support for two divergent concepts of pride: based on word clusters, one facet was linked to implications of genuine self-esteem (representing authentic pride), while the other facet was related to inferences of narcissism (representing hubristic pride). The cluster for authentic pride also included words such as “confident” and “accomplished”, whereas the cluster for hubristic pride included words like “arrogant” and “conceited” (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007). These two distinct categories of pride are now used in the debate regarding whether or not feelings of pride are ‘healthy’ or ‘narcissistic’.

According to Tracy et. al. (2010), authentic pride is positively related to extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience, whereas hubristic pride is negatively related to both agreeableness and conscientiousness. More importantly, feelings of pride, as well as the regulation of these feelings, have been linked to the regulation of self-esteem (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Specifically, authentic pride has been found to be positively associated with implicit and explicit self-esteem, with hubristic pride being negatively related to self-esteem and positively related to narcissism (Tracy et. al., 2010). This points to an interesting and important distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ self-esteem –

authentic pride represents what is often referred to as ‘genuine’ self-esteem (more socially desirable and achievement oriented), while hubristic pride represents what is known as ‘fragile’ self-esteem (more narcissistic and related to arrogance) (Tracy et. al., 2010). It is clear then, that the difference between authentic and hubristic pride may lie in their associations with narcissism and self-esteem, which also points to their clear representations as either ‘healthy pride’ (authentic pride) or ‘narcissistic pride’ (hubristic pride) (Bushman & Baumeister, 1988; Tracy et. al., 2010). Hart and Matsuba (2007) have also suggested that hubris requires different appraisal processes than authentic pride. They suggest that feelings of hubris results from attributing events and behaviours to internal, stable, and positive traits (such as being ‘the best’). This exists from a failure to recognize that the effort from oneself has led to appropriate judgments of responsibility and has produced a worthy outcome (i.e. moral action) (Hart & Matsuba, 2007). A similar process appears to happen with the presence of narcissism. Narcissism is generally characterized by feelings of entitlement, self-involvement, and self-centred orientations (Lannin, Gyll, Krizan, Madon, & Cornish, 2013). Narcissists have been found to experience feelings of grandeur, self-viewed high rank in comparison to others, often occurring in conjunction with feelings of entitlement (Wink, 1991), and entitlement (similar to that of hubristic pride), but are highly prone to experience anxiety and hypersensitivity for fear of being seen as inferior to others (Murray, 1938). In their study on narcissism and self- and peer-perceived aggressive and prosocial behaviour, Kauten and Barry (2014) found that adolescent self-reported narcissism was positively related to both aggression and prosocial behaviour, but not associated with peer nominations of either type of behaviour. This result can be attributed to the fact that narcissists use grandeur global appraisals (i.e. individual belief that one is great in all situations, across all

contexts), thus trying to socially represent themselves as ‘good’ or superior in an effort to avoid an undesirable social identity.

Authentic and hubristic pride also show a striking parallel to the negative emotions of shame and guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2007). According to Tangney et. al. (2007), the difference between guilt and shame is the focus on either the self or the behaviour, and authentic and hubristic pride can be explained in a similar way. Whereas shame reflects a negative evaluation of one’s entire self, hubristic pride also refers to a global feeling (e.g., individuals attribute success to them being a ‘perfect person’; feelings of superiority across all situations) (Tracy, et. al., 2009). Guilt, on the other hand, represents a negative appraisal of a particular behaviour, whereas authentic pride is similarly action-oriented and context-specific (Tracy et. al., 2009). Hubristic pride is often seen in congruence with characteristics such as exaggerated feelings of superiority as a result of the suppression of feelings of shame and inability, as well as unrealistic appraisals, whereas authentic pride is often characterized by confidence and self-worth, with appraisals based on effort rather than ability (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

In an effort to further explain this parallel relationship, Tracy and Robins (2007) conceptualized a theoretical model of self-conscious emotions, including the two facets of pride (authentic and hubristic). According to this model, self-conscious emotions occur when situations elicit self-evaluation and self-representations, as well as appraisals of the importance of these representations. In the case of pride, the context must match one’s positive self-representations, and pride will occur as a result of these internal attributions (Tracy & Robins, 2007). In regards to behaviour, authentic pride is experienced as a result of the specific situation or behaviour – it is focussed on the action/context, and occurs as a result of having positive

consequences for others (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007). This in turn produces internal motivation, which may also be related to a strong moral identity in terms of assessing moral behaviour. On the other hand, hubristic pride represents a more generalized, positive self-appraisal (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Unlike authentic pride, it is not related to specific behaviours or contexts. Hubristic pride focuses more on the individual's performance that reflects his/her greater capability in comparison to others. In fact, it has been suggested that experiencing hubristic pride may be part of a regulatory process that allows individuals high in narcissism to suppress feelings of shame by producing exaggerated and generalized feelings of pride and positive self-regard (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Hubristic pride may be more strongly related to external motivation, as well as a weaker moral identity, as individuals feel the need to attribute their positive behaviour to a global self-concept (for example, 'I am a perfect person'), rather than to their moral decision-making (for example, 'it was the right thing to do'). See Table 1 for an outline of the differences between authentic and hubristic pride.

Moral Motivation

Moral motivation refers to "the concerns and motives underlying moral actions (e.g., reasons for "why" someone should follow moral rules)" (Nunner-Winkler, 2008, p. 91). As previously discussed, both moral identity and moral emotion act as motivation to produce moral behaviour. Moral identity is a very important source of moral motivation and it can depend on various mechanisms in order to produce motivation to act morally: self-consistency, schemas, goal achievement, personality traits, and self-representations (Colby & Damon, 1992; Blasi, 2004; Hardy & Carlo 2011). Many theorists agree that emotions produce, and are also a product of, moral motivation (Blasi, 1999). As mentioned above, Blasi argued that emotions motivate behaviour through close relationships with other motivational mechanisms (i.e., goals, drives,

needs). Regardless of the type (moral identity or moral emotions), we can distinguish between internal versus external sources of motivation.

Moral actions and behaviour can occur for many different reasons, just like the centrality of one's moral values can become evident in different forms. Moral rules can be followed as a result of an individual's values and beliefs, or in order to avoid punishment and receive reward. If moral rules are being followed in order to avoid external consequences, the behaviour is externally motivated; however, if moral rules are followed because the individual believes them to be important, the behaviour is internally motivated (Krettenauer, 2011). It is important to note that although seemingly quite similar, moral identity and internal moral motivation do not represent the same construct. In their study on moral motivation, Nunner-Winkler et. al. (2007) found a positive correlation between internal moral motivation and moral centrality, suggesting that these variables are associated with one another. However it is possible, for instance, for an individual with a strong moral identity (highly moral values, beliefs, and goals) to be externally motivated (for example, to avoid disapproval from others) to produce moral behaviour. In addition, the effect that internal motivation has on an individual may be dependent upon the strength of one's moral identity (Krettenauer, 2011).

In order to investigate this further, Krettenauer (2011) analyzed the relationship between moral centrality and internal moral motivation in a cross-sectional study. Results showed a significant, positive correlation between moral centrality and internal moral motivation. In addition, internal moral motivation was a significant predictor of moral centrality, while external motivation was inversely related to moral centrality. Analyzing the relationship between autobiographical reasoning and moral identity development, Krettenauer & Mosleh (2013) also found that participants with higher internal moral motivation were able to make stronger

connections between past (im)moral actions and their current selves. In addition, individuals with higher internal moral motivation showed a better ability to understand the conflicting nature of past events. These findings support the theory that internal moral motivation and moral centrality are not only related conceptually, but empirically as well. The strong correlation between these two constructs found by Krettenauer (2011) also suggests that they are not mutually exclusive. However, results also showed that moral centrality and internal moral motivation each contributed autonomously to adolescents' responsibility taking, as well as interacted to predict moral emotion expectancies. These findings suggest that although associated with one another, moral centrality and internal moral motivation are in fact two different constructs.

In a path analysis, Krettenauer (2011) also found that the relationship between moral centrality and moral motivation becomes consistent over time. Specifically, external moral motivation, internal moral motivation, and moral centrality showed a stronger association during the adolescent age period. Interestingly, greater moral centrality also predicted an increase in internal moral motivation over time, suggesting that having a strong set of moral values and beliefs may lead to an increase in internal motivation to act morally across the lifespan. In addition, Krettenauer (2011) concluded that having moral values that are central to the self only creates a sense of responsibility if the individual is internally motivated. Thus, moral identity and internal moral motivation are related to one another and may also depend on one another in predicting responsibility and decision-making in moral contexts.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to build on existing knowledge on the relationships between moral identity, moral behaviour and moral emotion, as well as to provide further insight into the specific role that positive moral emotions play in determining moral behaviour. Specifically, the

relationships between moral identity (internalization and symbolization), moral motivation (internal versus external) and positive moral emotion (authentic pride versus hubristic pride) will be examined in relation to moral action. The goal was to determine whether authentic and hubristic pride can be differentiated empirically by developing a valid and reliable measure of pride, and subsequently use this questionnaire to conclude if the two facets of pride are differentially related to each of the other variables (i.e., moral identity, moral motivation). These findings should replicate and extend the work by Tracy and Robins (2007) on the differences between authentic and hubristic pride, and also provide insight as to how moral identity and moral motivation impact moral emotions in order to produce (im)moral behaviour. See Figure 1 for the proposed relationship among moral identity, moral motivation, and moral emotions.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

The current study aimed to fill important gaps that are currently present in moral development research. The main goal was to create a standardized measure of pride (authentic/hubristic) in order to investigate its role in moral development. There is very limited research on the role that positive moral emotions (as opposed to negative emotions) play in motivating behaviour and aiding in moral identity development. A large part of the current study focussed on developing a valid and reliable measure of pride in order to test the hypotheses. In addition, the goal of multiple hypotheses was to examine the role that moral identity, moral motivation (internal versus external), and moral emotion play in determining moral action.

Hypothesis 1: It was expected that authentic pride would be associated with the negative emotion of guilt, whereas hubristic pride would-be associated with shame and the personality trait of narcissism. Previous research has supported the claim of a parallel relationship between guilt and shame and authentic and hubristic pride. Recall that findings

reported by Tangney et. al. (2007) and Tracy et. al. (2009) point to similar appraisal processes between guilt and authentic pride (action-oriented and context specific) and shame and hubristic pride (global self-representations). Unlike authentic pride, hubristic pride has also been recognized as a ‘narcissistic pride’ in that it is often accompanied by conceitedness, arrogance, and inflated self-worth (Murray, 1938). More recently, Tracy et. al. (2009) found that both authentic pride and genuine self-esteem are positively related to supportive relationships, whereas hubristic pride and narcissistic self-esteem are associated with antisocial behaviour. Similar to these previous findings, a positive correlation between authentic pride and guilt is expected, whereas a positive correlation between hubristic pride, shame, and narcissism is expected, indicating that these negative and positive self-conscious emotions show similar appraisal processes.

Hypothesis 2: It was expected that authentic pride would be associated with moral identity internalization, whereas hubristic pride would be related to moral identity symbolization. Although moral identity is often referred to as one general concept, it is made up of two very different dimensions that are important to distinguish when discussing and analyzing relationships. Previous research has already found that emotion expectancies are important in determining the moral behaviour of adolescents; specifically, that moral emotion expectancies are related to both prosocial and antisocial behaviour (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). Furthermore, Johnston and Krettenauer (2011) have established that there exists a positive relationship between positive emotions and moral identity. Thus it is expected that authentic pride (‘genuine pride’) will be positively correlated with moral identity internalization – that is, internalizing moral values and beliefs as important to oneself will be associated with feeling of genuine or authentic pride following a moral action. However, Johnston and Krettenauer (2011) did find

that negative emotions were more strongly associated with moral identity than positive emotions. This attenuated relationship might be due to the fact that there are two facets of pride that are importantly distinguishable, as well as two components of moral identity that must be differentiated. Hubristic pride, being related to narcissism, inflated self-worth and concern for social superiority (Murray, 1938; Tracy & Robins 2004) shows a prominent similarity to the symbolization dimension of moral identity in that the focus lies on the ways in which an individual socially portrays their identity as based on certain values (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Thus, results should show a positive association between hubristic pride and moral identity symbolization.

Hypothesis 3: It was expected that authentic pride would be associated with internal moral motivation, whereas hubristic pride would be associated with external moral motivation. Emotions act as a source of moral motivation (Blasi, 1999; Hardy & Carlo, 2011). As emotions help guide our behaviour, perhaps it is the case that feelings of pride direct our actions in more socially acceptable ways. Just as Krettenauer & Mosleh (2013) found that individuals with higher internal moral motivation are able to make stronger connections between past (in)moral actions and their current selves, and showed a better ability to understand the conflicting nature of past events, it is expected that individuals with high levels of internal moral motivation will also express more feelings of pride specific to certain behaviours due to their positive consequences (i.e. authentic pride). As Krettenauer (2011) found, moral centrality and internal moral motivation are interrelated yet empirically different. Thus, just as moral identity and internal moral motivation are expected to be positively related, authentic pride should also be strongly associated with internal moral motivation. On the other hand, it is expected that hubristic pride should be less strongly associated with internal moral motivation and more

strongly related to external moral motivation. Hubristic pride, being associated with grandeur and the need to present a socially desirable identity to others, should show a strong association with external moral motivation, which is often characterized by avoidance of punishment (e.g. being frowned upon by others) (Krettenauer, 2011).

Research questions. In addition to the three hypotheses outlined, there were two major research questions that were also addressed in this investigation. The first question of interest was: what is the relationship between authentic and hubristic pride? Based on what has previously been discussed, we know that authentic and hubristic pride are related to very different personality characteristics and dispositions, as well as different appraisal processes in terms of behavior. But are these dimensions interrelated, or are they mutually exclusive? Although most of the research focuses on the differences between authentic and hubristic pride (see Tracy et. al. 2004/2009), these two facets still stem from an overall positive feeling of pride. Therefore, it was anticipated that authentic and hubristic pride will be related to one another. However, it is expected that authentic and hubristic pride will show associations with different aspects of moral identity, moral motivation, and negative moral emotions. This has not yet been studied in previous research and thus is exploratory in nature.

The second question, related to the use of two cohorts of an adolescent population, was: are there age differences in moral identity development and experiencing feelings of authentic and hubristic pride? Based on previous research suggesting that the bulk of moral identity development occurs during adolescence (Hardy & Carlo, 2011), as well as an increase of positive moral emotions during the teenage years (Krettenauer et. al., 2013), it was expected that undergraduate students would show higher scores for moral identity internalization and symbolization, as well as for feelings of both authentic and hubristic pride, compared to the high

school students. Correlations between moral identity (internalization/symbolization) and age would suggest the existence of a meaningful association between these two variables, supporting the notion that many aspects of moral identity development do occur during adolescence.

Associations between authentic and hubristic pride and age would also support the findings of Krettenauer et. al. (2013), and would also suggest that positive moral emotions play a much larger role in providing motivation for moral action than previously thought.

The Present Study

The purpose of the current study was two-fold. First, recent research has focussed on the ways in which emotions provide a source of motivation for action/inaction. Specifically, the role of self-conscious moral emotions (i.e., shame, guilt, empathy) have been examined as a source of motivation to act (im)morally. However, current research has neglected the role of positive moral emotions in predicting moral behaviour. The present study examined the importance of positive moral emotion (i.e., pride) in determining moral development and moral behaviour. In order to do so, it was necessary to develop a measure of pride that would reliably differentiate between its two facets (authentic and hubristic). A pilot study (Study 1) was conducted and devoted completely to the development of the pride measure in order to determine its suitability in assessing authentic and hubristic pride.

Secondly, the main study was run to test the original hypotheses and research questions. Research in the area of moral development has focussed on moral identity development in adolescence and early adulthood. The relationships between internal versus external motivation, moral identity, moral behaviour, and positive moral emotions have yet to be investigated. The proposed study will examine the role of moral identity, moral motivation, and moral emotions

(positive and negative) in determining (im)moral behaviour in adolescents. The main study will be discussed subsequent to the pilot study and be referred to as Study 2.

Study 1

Study 1 was a pilot study that involved developing a measure of pride that differentiated between authentic and hubristic pride. This study served as a preliminary study using undergraduate students as part of a larger research project, which consists of an added hour-long interview component with both high school and university students. The development of this questionnaire was an integral part of this research project as it is core to exploring the current hypotheses and expected outcomes for Study 2. In addition, developing this measure would aid future research in examining the influence of feelings of pride on other developmental variables, and may also serve as a means to begin to integrate the discussion of positive moral emotions into current and future moral development issues.

Method

Measure development. A questionnaire-style assessment containing morally-relevant scenarios was used to measure feelings of pride (see Appendix A). This was based on the approach used by Tangney and Dearing (2002) in their measure of shame and guilt. The first scenarios that were introduced in the questionnaire consisted of positive moral action – each scenario included moral action with positive outcomes. These scenarios were previously tested and therefore adopted from Johnston and Krettenauer (2011), where they used vignettes describing everyday moral obligations and how participants rated feeling about (dis)regarding these moral actions as a means of assessing moral emotion expectancies. Each norm-regarded scenario represented one of three moral situations that were designed to capture the range of moral problems that often occur in everyday life. Three kinds of moral behaviour included: 1)

prosocial – representing one’s desire to help others, for example “Some students from your school ask you to donate money for charity. You think that they really pursue a good cause. You donate even though you had already made plans to spend the money another way”; 2) *resistance* – representing resisting the temptation to do wrong, for example “While you are strolling through a small store, you see a product that you would really like to have. However, you cannot afford to buy it. As no one is watching you, you consider taking the object without paying. You decide *not* to take the product and leave the store empty handed”; and 3) *bystander intervention* – involves preventing others from immoral action, for example “While you are strolling through a flea market you notice somebody stealing a valuable object from one of the sales booths. You tell the vendor about the incident and the vendor immediately contacts security in order to pursue the thief.” In order to include a broader range of moral situations, a few more scenarios describing positive moral action were developed and added. Two prosocial moral behaviour scenarios were removed because they did not fit well with the rest of the questionnaire. A total of 10 positive moral behaviour scenarios were used in the final questionnaire (two prosocial, four resisting temptation, four bystander intervention). After reading each scenario, participants are asked to rate how they would feel about themselves in that situation on a 7-point scale ranging from 1(*very bad*) to 7 (*very good*).

Following the inclusion and development of moral scenarios, items representing reasons why individuals rate their feelings about the scenario to be good/bad were developed. Based on a general understanding of authentic pride (action specific, reinforces positive behaviour) and hubristic pride (global self-representations, positive associations with narcissism), items were developed representing each facet. Originally, twelve items were created (six authentic, six hubristic) and tested for face validity. Each pride item represented reasons for decision-making,

which were parallel for each scenario. The six authentic pride items in each scenario represented the following reasons: *A1* – positive consequences for others, *A2* – evaluation of action as good/right, *A3* – moral luck (being there at the right time), *A4* – making the right decision, *A5* – normativity of behaviour, *A6* – opportunity to do good/right. The six hubristic pride items in each scenario represented the following decision-making reasoning: *H1* – being more virtuous than others, *H2* – leaving good impressions on others, *H3* – being superior/standing out, *H4* – being praiseworthy, *H5* – non-normativity of behaviour, *H6* – personal consistency of moral behaviour. Initially, three graduate students at Wilfrid Laurier University were asked to categorize one-hundred and twenty pride items (twelve items, ten scenarios) as either authentic or hubristic to test the face validity. Review of authentic/hubristic pride item categorization showed excellent inter-rater agreement for both dimensions. Eighty-five percent agreement among students was found for both authentic and hubristic pride items. Upon completion of the categorization of items a couple of ambiguities were eliminated by adjusting the wording of some items after discussing disagreements between raters. The following is an example of a positive scenario with 6 statements representing authentic pride (**A**) and 6 statements representing hubristic pride (**H**) (see Appendix A for full questionnaire, please note that the order of presentation of both positive and negative scenarios and items were randomized in the questionnaire):

“While you are riding on the bus you notice a group of youngsters in the back bullying another kid. The bus driver seems to be too busy to realize what is happening. At the next stop, you decide to tell the driver what is going on at the back of the bus. The driver intervenes and the youngsters are made to sit at the front of the bus for the rest of the year.”

H I am a highly courageous person

A What I did, is morally right

<i>H</i> I did what others would not have done	<i>A</i> I did what everyone is expected to do
<i>H</i> I am braver than others	<i>A</i> I cared for the kid who was bullied
<i>H</i> I am outstanding	<i>A</i> I made the right decision to tell the bus driver
<i>H</i> Others will think of me as a hero	<i>A</i> I took the opportunity to help the victim
<i>H</i> I always stand up for others.	<i>A</i> I am lucky that I happened to see what was going on in the back of the bus

To include an accurate representation of both positive and negative moral emotions, as well as to investigate the relationship between authentic/hubristic pride and guilt/shame, ten scenarios were added representing immoral action (with negative outcomes). A combination of Tangney and Dearing's (2002) TOSCA for adolescents and TOSCA for adults was used in order to ensure that these scenarios all had some moral meaning similar to the pride scenarios. Only the scenarios that related to a moral context, or included moral content, were selected for use. For example, "Imagine that you had to complete a group project at school. You make a mistake on the project, but one of your classmates gets blamed for the error. You decide not to say anything to the teacher and let your classmate take the fall". These scenarios only include three items for reasoning in decision-making: one representing guilt, one representing shame, and one representing the tendency to deny responsibility for these events by externalization. The externalization reasons were included as a filler item in order to make the number of items for the positive (11) and negative (3) scenarios less imbalanced. Therefore, the externalization items will not be further considered in the context of this thesis.

Participants. The pilot study included a sample of 59 undergraduate students ($M_{age} = 19.77$, $SD = 1.09$, 14 males) from Wilfrid Laurier University. Students were recruited through the online Psychology Research Experience Program (PREP) in exchange for course credit. All students were required to submit written informed consent before participating in the study and

were treated according to the American Psychological Association and Canadian Psychological Association ethical guidelines.

Procedure. Upon consent from Wilfrid Laurier University's Research Ethics Board and written informed consent from the participants, the pilot study commenced in order to determine the suitability of the pride questionnaire. Six time slots (each time slot being 45 minutes long), twice a week, were available for students to sign-up for at their leisure through the online PREP system. All students were asked to come to the researcher's lab in order to complete the paper questionnaire. Scenarios and items were presented in randomized order. Students were awarded .5 credits for their participation.

Results

Factor analysis. To examine whether the items representing different appraisals for authentic and hubristic pride form two distinct dimensions or scales, a factor analysis was run. To this end all homologous items expressing a particular thought or belief were averaged across scenarios (e.g. Item A1 (positive consequences for others) was combined across all positive scenarios). Having 12 items per scenario, 6 authentic and 6 hubristic, resulted in six items A1 to A6 for authentic pride (combined across scenarios) and H1-H6 for hubristic pride. For example, **A1** represents behaving morally because of positive consequences for others ("I cared for the kid who was bullied"), whereas **H1** represents being more virtuous than others ("I am braver than others") (see Table 2 for other aggregated item descriptions). A factor analysis of these items was performed, applying a principal component analysis extraction and a Varimax rotation method with Kaiser normalization. Both the "Scree-test" and Kaiser criterion (Eigenvalues > 1) suggested a two factor solution. The first component generated an Eigenvalue of 5.68, accounting for 47.33% of the total variance. The second component yielded an Eigenvalue of

2.97, accounting for 24.72% of the total variance. Cumulatively, these components accounted for 72.05% of the total variance. The rotated component matrix showed items A1-A6 loading significantly onto Factor 1 and items H1-H5 loading significant onto Factor 2 (see Table 2 for factor analysis results). The H6 aggregated item representing reasons for consistently displaying moral behaviour (for example “I always stand up for others”) did not differentiate between the two factors (Factor 1 – 0.52, Factor 2 – 0.61). Therefore, all H6 items were removed from the questionnaire. Authentic pride items came out with an excellent Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .92$), as did the hubristic pride items ($\alpha = .89$).

Correlation analysis. A correlation analysis was conducted in order to determine the relationship (if any) between authentic ($M = 4.1$, $SD = .41$) and hubristic pride ($M = 3.1$, $SD = .50$). Authentic pride and hubristic pride showed a positive correlation with one another ($r = .43$, $p < .001$).

Discussion

Study 1 involved developing a measure of the positive moral emotion of pride that differentiates between authentic and hubristic facets. In line with previous research that has suggested the existence of two facets of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Hart & Matsuba, 2007) the factor analysis showed two separate factors, one represented by authentic pride items and one represented by hubristic pride items. However, because H6 did not load differentially on one factor, it was removed from the questionnaire, resulting in six authentic pride items and five hubristic pride items per scenario. This may have been a result of the unclear wording of the item, and its similarity to other authentic and hubristic pride items. Based on the understanding of authentic pride as context and action specific, and hubristic pride as made up of global self-representations, one’s assumed superiority in relation to others, we were able to

determine potential prideful reasons for moral behaviour and subsequently use these reasons to reliably measure different kinds of pride. With an alpha of .92 (authentic) and .89 (hubristic), it can be said that these moral behaviour scenarios and related pride items are a reliable way to measure authentic and hubristic pride.

The positive association found between authentic and hubristic pride is not surprising. Previous studies, without separating or considering two facets of pride, have found that the overall single, unified construct of pride is linked to prosocial and adaptive behaviours (Weiner, 1985; Tracy & Robins, 2007). It was not until recently that it was argued that pride can serve very different roles. Tracy and Robins (2007) has suggested that it is not until we begin to tease apart the prosocial associations of pride from the self-fulfilling attributions of pride that we see the difference between the authentic and hubristic facets. Although these facets are distinct, the self-conscious emotion of pride is still elicited by both focussed attention to the self (hubris) and an appraisal of the specific event (authentic) (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Hart & Matsuba, 2007). This explains why a strong relationship was found between authentic and hubristic pride – although they represent different attribution styles, they still stem from the same overarching self-conscious emotion. However, this does not diminish the importance of differentiating between authentic and hubristic pride. If anything, it provides clear evidence that we must examine both facets of pride and account for different appraisal processes in decision-making and motivation when trying to determine reasons for moral behaviour.

These results suggest that along with the negative moral emotions of shame and guilt, positive moral emotions (such as pride) can also be measured reliably. In addition, this provides support for the importance of examining positive moral emotions, as well as distinguishing

between different types of these emotions, as they clearly influence motivation for action in moral situations and likely in other situations and dilemmas in our daily life.

Study 2

Study 2 involved the analyses of the hypotheses and research questions. The purpose of this study was to use the valid and reliable measure of pride developed in Study 1 in order to investigate the relationships among moral identity, moral motivation, and moral emotions. Specifically, Study 2 looked at how moral identity (internalization and symbolization), moral motivation (internal versus external), and negative moral emotions (i.e., shame and guilt) are differentially related to authentic and hubristic pride in adolescents (both high school and university students).

Method

Participants. Participants in Study 2 included 98 adolescents from three Canadian Grade 10 high school classes ($M_{\text{age}} = 14.88$, $SD = 0.62$) and 118 undergraduate university students ($M_{\text{age}} = 20.02$, $SD = 3.47$). The Kitchener-Waterloo region consists of a culturally diverse population with varying socioeconomic statuses and ethnic backgrounds. Overall, male participants made up 49.5% of the sample ($n = 107$). The most frequently reported ethnicity was Canadian ($n = 45$, 20.8%), however other ethnicities included German (.07%), Chinese (.02%), Dutch (.02%), Vietnamese (.02%), and Indian (.01%). Demographic information on parental occupation was also collected to compute an overall socio-economic status (SES) score. Participants were asked to provide a brief description of both their mothers' and fathers' current occupation. Subsequently, the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) was used to categorize these parental occupations. This system provides guidelines as to how jobs are classified, as well as a description of tasks and duties generally required for each job

(International Labour Organization, 2004). Two graduate students were asked to classify the parental occupations to ensure inter-rater reliability. Upon resolution of conflict with regards to classifying some executives and business owners, all other occupations were easily classified and agreed upon. ISCO-88 scores were transposed into occupational prestige scores, which were used as a representation of SES, by using the Standard International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (Ganzeboom, de Graaf, Treiman and Leeuw, 1992). The ISEI scale is a well validated measure of SES. Once the occupations for both mother and father were classified, scores for both parents ($M_{\text{mother}} = 51.41$, $SD = 15.92$; $M_{\text{father}} = 50.93$, $SD = 17.52$) were averaged for an overall SES score ($M = 51.13$, $SD = 14.46$). There was a relationship between mothers' and fathers' SES scores ($r = .31^{**}$, $p < .01$). There were no significant differences in SES between the high school ($M = 51.82$, $SD = 15.58$) and university students ($M = 50.56$, $SD = 13.50$) age groups, $t(200) = .62$, ns (SES information of 16 participants was either not classifiable or not provided in the questionnaire).

Parents of the Grade 10 students were asked to provide written informed consent for their child. High school students were compensated \$5 for their participation in the study. Undergraduate students were recruited from first-year psychology courses at Wilfrid Laurier University through the online PREP system in return for course credit and were also asked to provide written informed consent. At the conclusion of the study all participants were given a debriefing letter, thanking them for their involvement, explaining the purpose of the study, and how they may access the results. All participants were treated in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans.

Procedure. Time slots for entering two math classrooms and distributing the questionnaires at the high school were arranged with the principals and math teachers.

Questionnaire distribution and collection was completed in one day. Students had one hour to fill out hard copies of the questionnaires in the classroom and received \$5 once they were completed. These students were also given the opportunity to provide their personal contact information at the back of the questionnaire if they were interested in participating in any future research studies.

Undergraduate students were able to sign up for two-hour time slots through the online PREP system. These students participated as part of a larger study, which included an hour long interview in addition to the questionnaire. Students first completed an hour long interview with the researcher and were then asked to complete an online version of the questionnaire through the Qualtrics system (at the researcher's lab). Students were assigned 1 credit toward their course grade once the interview and questionnaire was completed.

Measures

Pride. The questionnaire measure of pride developed in Study 1 was used here (see Appendix A). This questionnaire consisted of the same ten positive scenarios representing three different kinds of moral behaviour (see Study 1). Participants were asked to rate how they would feel about themselves in these scenarios on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*very bad*) to 7 (*very good*). Participants then rated 11 statements about each scenario that provided either authentic (e.g. "What I did is morally right") or hubristic (e.g. "I am braver than others") reasons for positive self-evaluative emotion on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 5 (*very likely*). The order of the scenarios were randomized, as well as the order of the 11 authentic/hubristic statements related to each scenario.

Moral Identity. To assess moral identity, the self-importance of moral identity measure developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) was used. Participants were given a set of 9

characteristics (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind) and asked to imagine a person (themselves or someone else) who has these characteristics. Participants then rated 10 statements (e.g., “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics”) on a 7-point scale from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*). This measure consisted of two 5-item subscales: *internalization* – the degree to which moral traits are central to one’s self-concept (e.g., “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am”), and *symbolization* – the extent to which one displays their social identity as being based on moral traits (e.g., “I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics”) ($\alpha = .79$).

Moral Motivation. Adopted from Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), the questionnaire asked participants to rate various reasons for why it is important to act morally on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all important*) to 5 (*very important*). Six different moral actions were presented, representing three different types of moral norms (respecting others’ property, being honest, not physically harming others). Four different reasons were presented with each action, which represent the four levels of self-integration (according to self-determination theory): 1) *external*, which represent external consequences that one might encounter for a moral transgression (e.g., “Because I wouldn’t want to get in trouble for lying”); 2) *introjected*, referring to a negative impression that one might leave on others (e.g., “Because I would not want people to think of me as a liar”); 3) *identified*, representing self-importance of a moral norm (e.g., “Because it is important to me that people tell the truth”), and 4) *integrated*, which includes reasons that represent a moral norm as part of an ideal self (e.g., “Because I want to consider myself an honest person”).

Ratings for the external and introjected reasons were combined into one scale representing *external moral motivation* ($\alpha = .82$), whereas scores for identified and integrated reasons were combined to form *internal moral motivation* ($\alpha = .88$).

Shame and Guilt (TOSCA). Feelings of shame and guilt were measured using a well-validated questionnaire developed by Tangney and Dearing (2002). Ten scenarios with negative outcomes were included. For example, “You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog runs away”. Participants were asked to rate how they would feel about themselves in these scenarios on a 7-point scale from 1 (*very bad*) to 7 (*very good*). Participants then rated 3 statements about the scenario that provide either shame (e.g. “I feel irresponsible and incompetent”) ($\alpha = .62$), guilt (e.g. “I vow to be more careful next time”) ($\alpha = .79$), or externalization (e.g., “I would think my friend could just get a new dog) reasons for negative self-evaluative emotions on a scale from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 5 (*very likely*).

Narcissism (NPI-16). The Narcissism Personality Inventory (NPI) was used to assess narcissism in this study. Originally developed by Raskin and Terry (1988) with strong internal and external validity, an adapted shortened version (NPI-16) established by Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006) was used. The NPI-16 is a short measure of narcissism of well-documented validity. Participants were presented with 16 sets of statements (A, B) and asked to choose which of the two statements is closer to their own feelings about themselves. Choices were computed, with higher scores indicating a higher number of narcissistic responses ($\alpha = .75$). The following is an example of a set of A,B statements from the NPI-16:

- A. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.
- B. When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.

Social Desirability Response Bias. This study also included a well-validated measure of the social desirability response bias developed by Stöber (2001). This measure has been successfully used with younger age groups (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006) and has also been validated in a North American context (Blake, Valdiserri, Neuendorf, & Nemeth, 2006). Participants were provided with 17 statements describing socially desirable/undesirable behaviours and asked to state whether or not the statement describes them in a true/false format ($\alpha = .71$).

Results

As outlined previously, three hypotheses and two research questions were investigated. In the following, the results are presented as they relate to each hypothesis and question. Mainly bivariate and partial correlations were used, with the exception of two hierarchical regressions. For all main analyses an alpha level of .05 was used (see Table 3 for all means and standard deviations).

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis pertained to the relationship between authentic and hubristic pride, shame, guilt, and narcissism. A bivariate correlation was run, which showed a strong correlation between authentic pride and guilt ($r = .66, p < .01$) and a weaker association between hubristic pride and guilt ($r = .27, p < .01$). Using Steiger's Z (Z_H) the difference between dependent correlations was tested for statistical significance. Results indicated a significant difference in the correlations between authentic pride and guilt and hubristic pride and guilt ($Z_H = 6.45, p < .001$). However, both forms of pride were positively correlated with shame ($r_{\text{authenticpride}} = .26, p < .01$; $r_{\text{hubristic pride}} = .26, p < .01$).

Recall that a higher score on the NPI-16 (narcissism scale) indicated more narcissistic tendencies. Bivariate correlations indicated a moderate relationship between hubristic pride and

narcissism ($r = .32, p < .01$), whereas authentic pride showed no association with narcissism (see Table 4). The correlation between hubristic pride and narcissism was significantly higher than that of authentic pride and narcissism ($Z_H = 4.49, p < .001$).

The role of age in moral development, specifically with feelings of pride, was one of the main research questions for this study. Here, age was also analyzed using a bivariate correlation with pride, shame, guilt, and narcissism in order to identify potential associations with positive and negative moral emotions. Exact age (in years) was found to be slightly negatively related only to feelings of shame ($r = -.15, p = .03$), indicating that as age increases feelings of shame tend to decrease (see Table 4).

Study 1 found that authentic and hubristic pride were positively correlated with one another. These findings were replicated in Study 2 ($r = .43^{**}, p < .01$). In order to analyze the individual relationships between authentic and hubristic pride and negative moral emotions, partial correlations were conducted controlling for each facet. When controlling for authentic pride the relationship between hubristic pride and narcissism increased. On the other hand, when controlling for hubristic pride the association between authentic pride and narcissism became negative (see Table 5 for all partial correlations). Furthermore, controlling for one facet of pride while analyzing the other changed some initial relationships. This holds true in the case of the relationship between authentic pride and feelings of shame and guilt, as these associations decreased when controlling for hubristic pride. Similarly, while controlling for authentic pride the relationship between hubristic pride and shame and guilt decreased, however the association with narcissism strengthens.

Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis pertained to the relationship between authentic and hubristic pride and moral identity internalization and symbolization. Moral identity

internalization was found to be strongly correlated with authentic pride ($r = .60, p < .01$), with a weak relationship with hubristic pride ($r = .12, p = .08$). These correlations were significantly different from one another ($Z_H = 7.41, p < .001$). Conversely, a relationship was found between moral identity symbolization and hubristic pride ($r = .44, p < .01$) and authentic pride ($r = .34, p < .01$). There was no significant difference in the correlations of authentic and hubristic pride with moral identity symbolization. These findings confirm that feelings of pride and moral identity are empirically related, specifically that authentic pride and moral identity internalization are strongly associated and conversely hubristic pride and moral identity symbolization are strongly related. Age was not significantly associated with moral identity internalization or symbolization (see Table 6).

Controlling for authentic pride increased the correlation between hubristic pride and moral identity internalization, which became negative. However, the association between hubristic pride and moral identity symbolization decreased (See Table 7 for all partial correlations). This provides more evidence for the important relationship between authentic and hubristic pride, as well as begins to point out the importance of certain aspects of pride in moral identity development.

Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis speculated about the relationship between authentic and hubristic pride and moral motivation (internal versus external). Internal moral motivation was found to be strongly related to authentic pride ($r = .66, p < .01$), with only a moderate association with hubristic pride ($r = .30, p < .01$). There was a significant difference between these correlations ($Z_H = 6.01, p < .001$). Both authentic pride ($r = .38, p < .01$) and hubristic pride ($r = .43, p < .01$) were related to external moral motivation but were not significantly

different from one another. There was no significant relationship found between internal/external moral motivation and age (see Table 8).

Partial correlations showed that when controlling for hubristic pride, the relationship between authentic pride and both internal and external moral motivation decreased. More importantly, and much more significantly, when controlling for authentic pride the association between hubristic pride and internal moral motivation becomes negligible ($r = .02, p = .79$) (see Table 9 for all partial correlations). These results suggest that when holding authentic pride constant, the association between hubristic pride and internal moral motivation disappears, which supports the distinct differences between the two forms of pride.

Hierarchical regression. In order to take the correlation between the various predictor variables and authentic and hubristic pride into account, a hierarchical multiple regression was used. Authentic pride was initially analyzed as the dependent variable. In the first step, hubristic pride, gender, and social desirability bias was entered (to control for these variables). In the second step, moral identity (internalization and symbolization) and moral motivation (internal and external) were entered as predictors. Results of the regression analysis provide confirmation of the hypotheses of the relationship between moral identity internalization, internal moral motivation, and authentic pride (see Table 10). Specifically, when controlling for hubristic pride, moral identity internalization and internal moral motivation became the only significant variables in predicting authentic pride.

Subsequently, hubristic pride was analyzed as the dependent variable with authentic pride, gender, and social desirability bias as control variables. In step 2, moral identity (internalization and symbolization) and moral motivation (internal and external) were entered as predictors. Results show support for original hypotheses that moral identity symbolization and external

moral motivation are significant predictors of hubristic pride, whereas moral identity internalization was a significant negative predictor (see Table 11).

Relationships with age. In addition to investigating the correlational relationships with age, t-tests were conducted to determine any significant differences in moral identity, moral motivation, and pride between the high school and university age groups.

Independent samples t-tests. A Bonferroni correction of $p < .008$ was used for all independent sample t-tests. There were no significant differences in authentic pride or hubristic pride scores between the high school and university age groups (see Table 12). There were also no significant differences in the moral identity internalization or symbolization scores between high school and university students (see Table 13). In addition, no significant differences were found for internal or external motivation scores between high school students and university students (see Table 14). However, results showed a significant difference in narcissism between the high school and university age groups, suggesting that the university students (mid-adolescence to early adulthood) report more narcissistic beliefs than high school students (late childhood to early adolescence) (See Table 15).

Differences in moral identity, moral motivation, and pride between males and females were also analyzed. Results showed a significant difference in the moral identity internalization and symbolization scores for males and females (see Table 16). This indicates that females reported both moral identity internalization and symbolization more than males. A significant difference was also found in authentic pride scores between males and females, suggesting that females experience and report more feelings of authentic pride than males. There were no significant differences in hubristic pride scores between genders (see Table 17).

In addition, a significant difference in internal and external moral motivation scores for males and females was found (see Table 18). These findings indicate that females experience both types of moral motivation (internal and external) more than males.

Discussion

The main goal of this study was to investigate the empirical relationships between moral identity, moral emotions, and moral behaviour. Although much research has been conducted on moral identity development and moral action, the investigation of moral emotions has mostly focussed on negative emotions (i.e., shame and guilt) and has thus left a gap in understanding the role of positive emotions (i.e., pride). The creation of the pride questionnaire allowed for the distinction between authentic and hubristic pride in response to moral behaviour, thus indicating how these two facets of pride are associated with aspects of moral identity and moral motivation in adolescence. This helped to identify the linkages between moral identity internalization, internal moral motivation, and authentic pride, as well as among moral identity symbolization, external moral motivation, and hubristic pride. In addition, it helped begin to fill the gaps in literature on moral development that has previously found attenuated relationships between positive versus negative moral emotions and moral identity (e.g., Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011).

Hypothesis 1. Authentic pride was found to be strongly associated with negative feelings of guilt, suggesting that these emotions may be two sides of the same coin – authentic pride and guilt mirror each other as one another's positive/negative counterpart. This finding is consistent with what has been suggested by Tangney et al. (2007) and Tracy and Robins (2007) that both authentic pride and guilt are context-specific and focus on the appraisals of specific behaviours of the individual. Conversely, hubristic pride represents a type of narcissistic pride, characterized by entitlement, feelings of grandeur, and superiority to others, as previously suggested by

Bushman and Baumeister (1988) and Lannin, Guyl, Krizan, Madon, and Cornish (2013), which is in line with the strong association with narcissism (particularly when controlling for authentic pride in the present study). This suggests that higher levels of hubristic pride are related to narcissistic beliefs.

However, findings of the relationships between both facets of pride and shame are inconsistent with previous research. Interestingly, negative emotions do tend to decrease over time, whereas positive moral emotions increase over time (Krettenauer, Malti, Colasante, & Buchman, 2012). It may be the case that feelings of shame are infrequent during the adolescent age period, thus making differences in the relationship between shame and authentic pride and shame and hubristic pride undetectable. Furthermore, the positive self-evaluative emotion of hubristic pride may not necessarily be related to negative self-evaluative emotions. Because hubristic pride does not stem from the internalization, or personal importance, of moral values, it does not have the ability to predict negative emotions in response to a moral transgression. This points to the distinction between authentic and hubristic pride, in that hubristic pride results from more external cues and does not require the internalization of moral values.

Hypothesis 2. Results confirm that feelings of pride and moral identity are empirically related, specifically that authentic pride and moral identity internalization are strongly associated, and conversely that hubristic pride and moral identity symbolization are strongly related. This identifies an important positive relationship between pride and moral identity in that having moral values and beliefs that are important and central to oneself – moral identity as explained by Aquino and Reed (2002) and Hardy and Carlo (2011) – is related to positive feelings after a moral behaviour (i.e. pride). The strong relationship between internalization and authentic pride links to Blasi's Self-Model (Blasi, 1983). Perhaps individuals with more moral

self-integration (making moral judgements and feelings of moral responsibility), which stems from moral identity, have internalized moral values that influence their decision to act in specific situations. This may lead to feelings of achievement, agency, and communion, all of which are associated with authentic pride. It is also likely that individuals high on moral identity internalization have highly moral values and beliefs similar to moral exemplars, and thus have highly morally relevant schemas that are easily accessible and comprehensively used in directing action (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Aquino et. al., 2009). Because the accessibility of moral schemas allows for quick reactions and certainty in decisions to act morally in specific situations, authentic pride is likely to follow.

The relationship between hubristic pride and moral identity symbolization, however, suggests that feelings of hubristic pride are associated with more instances of symbolization, or the display to others of their identity as being based on moral characteristics (Aquino & Reed, 2002). In this case, it may not be so much that the individual experiences judgements of responsibility to act (Blasi, 1983), but rather want to portray themselves to others as a moral person. Moral emotions serve as moderators of the relationship between moral standards and moral behaviour (Tangney et. al., 2007). If an individual does not place high importance on having moral values and beliefs, but rather is concerned with portraying oneself as highly moral, anticipating feelings of pride before the action, and experiencing feelings of hubristic pride post-action, is likely to occur.

The role of authentic pride, and other factors associated with this emotion, might play a crucial role in moral behaviour and moral identity development as suggested by its effect on the relationship between hubristic pride and symbolization when holding it constant. Johnston and Krettenauer (2011) have already established that there is a positive relationship between positive

emotions and moral identity. However, moral identity (or moral self-integration) is made up of two constructs: moral centrality and moral motivation (Krettenauer, 2011). It may be the case that authentic pride, characterized by internal situation-specific attributions, is experienced as a result of having a strong moral identity and positive consequences for others (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007), which in turn produces internal moral motivation. Therefore, authentic pride and moral motivation might be the key to having an overall strong moral identity and to producing consistent moral behaviour.

Hypothesis 3. Results support this hypothesis, where reports of authentic pride were related to high levels of internal moral motivation and feelings of hubristic pride were associated with higher levels of external moral motivation. Just as Krettenauer & Mosleh (2013) found that individuals with higher internal moral motivation are able to make stronger connections between past (im)moral actions, it was found that individuals with high levels of internal moral motivation experienced feelings of pride specific to certain behaviours (i.e. authentic pride). Similar to the findings of Krettenauer (2011) that moral identity and moral motivation are related (yet conceptually different), authentic pride and internal moral motivation were found to be related to one another. Because authentic pride was found to be related to moral identity internalization, as well as being achievement-oriented and referred to as ‘genuine self-esteem’, it makes sense that one would be internally motivated by personal responsibility and moral centrality to act morally (Blasi, 1983; Tracy et. al., 2010; Krettenauer, 2011). Hubristic pride, on the other hand, marked by global self-appraisals and the need to portray one’s greater capability in relation to others, indicates that individuals who experience more hubristic pride are externally motivated by feedback from others (Krettenauer, 2011).

Having already found a significant relationship between authentic pride, moral identity internalization, and internal moral motivation, it is clear that partialling authentic pride out of the equation affects all other internally-related variables (internalization, internal moral motivation). This suggests that the presence of certain aspects of authentic pride are important for internally motivating moral action. Although individuals may engage in moral action due to high levels of moral identity symbolization, external moral motivation, and anticipatory feelings of hubristic pride, these actions are not genuine or based on personal values that are central to oneself, and thus remain not at all internally motivated. A lack of internal moral motivation may point to a unique yet problematic aspect of moral identity that should be examined in future studies.

Supplementing the findings regarding the relationship between pride, moral identity and moral motivation, the hierarchical regression showed that moral identity internalization and internal moral motivation were the only significant predictors of authentic pride (when controlling for hubristic pride, social desirability, and gender). Previously, Nunner-Winkler et. al. (2007) found a positive relationship between internal moral motivation and moral centrality, however it has been argued that an individual with a strong moral identity can be externally motivated. In addition, Krettenauer (2011) suggested that the effect that internal motivation has on an individual may depend on the strength of moral identity. Here, we see that when separating the two facets of pride, as well as the two dimensions of moral identity, these relationships become much clearer. Internal moral motivation may work together with the internalization dimension of moral identity in order to produce authentic pride.

Congruent with previous hypotheses and research, moral identity symbolization and external moral motivation were significant predictors of hubristic pride. Similar to the findings by Nunner-Winkler et. al. (2007), there exists a positive relationship between moral identity

symbolization and external moral motivation that predicts hubristic pride. Replicating the findings for Hypothesis 2, moral identity internalization was a significant negative predictor of hubristic pride. This makes sense, since hubristic pride does not require the individual to place personal importance on moral values, but rather focuses more on an outward display of superiority (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

Age and gender differences. No differences were found between high school and university students in regards to feelings of authentic and hubristic pride, moral identity internalization and symbolization, or external and internal moral motivation. The lack of significant results may be due to the fact that these cohorts were quite close together (approximately five years apart) – a larger gap between age groups might be more telling. In addition, previous research has suggested that there are early signs of moral development present in children (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Kochanska, 2002; Campbell, 2012). It may be important to include participants in late childhood/early adolescence and compare them to those in late adolescence/young adulthood in order to analyze age differences in moral identity development

In addition to age differences, gender differences were also examined. Interestingly, females reported more moral identity internalization and symbolization than males, as well as more feelings of authentic pride than males. Females also indicated that they experience more internal and external moral motivation than males. Hoffman (1975) found that females experience more consideration for others, which suggests that they experience higher levels of both agency and communion and thus leads them to experience higher levels of both types of moral motivation. In this case, positive moral scenarios may have prompted the females' motivation to care for others, subsequently affecting their responses for the remaining scenarios.

In addition, Nunner-Winkler (2007) suggested that in regards to action, women are more willing to consider the needs of others. Perhaps the females were more likely to be agreeable overall when responding to the questionnaire, thus causing a response bias. Furthermore, morally undesirable traits are often attributed to males (leading to lower moral motivation) (Nunner-Winkler, 2007)., whereas most positive moral traits are attributed to females (leading to higher moral motivation) (Nunner-Winkler, 2007).

Conclusions. The present study provides new information on the relations between moral identity, moral motivation, and moral emotions in terms of assessing the moral behaviour of adolescents. Although authentic and hubristic pride are associated with different aspects of moral identity and moral motivation, they are empirically related to one another. Both authentic and hubristic pride stem from an overall positive feeling following an action, which makes their relationship inevitable. In addition, aspects of both authentic and hubristic pride can work together, at the same time. For example, narcissism tends to be very high in adolescents (Maxwell et. al, 2011; Kauten & Barry, 2013), which we see in the results from the current student (university students scored higher on the narcissism scale). This might make it difficult for individuals at this age to differentiate reasons (authentic or hubristic) for acting morally. It is important for future studies to take this relationship into consideration, as well as continue to analyze the two facets of pride separately.

Analysis of the associations among these variables brings to light a different understanding of moral identity than has been portrayed in past and current research. Previously understood as one-dimensional in how important having moral values and beliefs is to one's identity (e.g., Damon & Hart, 1992; Bergman, 2004; Hardy & Carlo, 2011), analyses in the current study provide evidence for a multi-dimension approach to moral identity. Correlational

and regression analyses showed two very distinct relationships that can be categorized as *internal* (moral identity internalization, internal moral motivation, authentic pride) and *external* (moral identity symbolization, external moral motivation, hubristic pride). The more internal aspect of moral identity appears to be marked by personally relevant and important values and beliefs that guide behaviour and often results in positive, authentic feelings following a moral action. The external dimension can be described as based on wanting to appear moral, guided by feedback from peers and not necessarily based on personally relevant moral values. Just as distinguishing between the two facets of pride became important, future research should consider the existence of a multi-faceted moral identity and the role that this plays in moral behaviour.

Implications. The findings of this research suggest that although overarching positive feelings of pride occur following moral action, the reasons and motivation for engaging in such moral behaviour predicts the type of pride experienced – either authentic or hubristic. The important focus now becomes how to increase and maintain moral identity internalization and internal moral motivation, which leads to feelings of authentic pride. Although individuals who are externally motivated and are high on moral identity symbolization engage in moral behaviour, this behaviour may not remain consistent because of its dependence on external, social rewards. This may become increasingly important during the building of the moral self in late childhood. As mentioned previously, there are early indications of moral development in children (Kochanska, 2002; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). Perhaps, for instance, children and adolescents need to be given reasons for striving to do good and avoid bad (as opposed to receiving rewards or punishments). For example, youth are often engaged in fundraising ‘competitions’ within their school, where the students who raise the most money receive a prize. In this case, engaging in both prosocial and moral behaviour is motivated by an external reward

and not based on personally relevant moral values and beliefs. Understanding the positive and negative emotional consequences of one's behaviour (i.e., pride versus shame) may be easier for individuals to internalize and thus be more consistently influential on decision-making. The goal would be to ensure that children and adolescence are not only able to reiterate what they have been told is 'right' and 'wrong', but that they have personal preferences for acting that way and find the reasons for behaving morally important to the self.

Limitations and suggestions for future research. The present study is not without limitations. As mentioned earlier, a larger age difference, or even a longitudinal study, starting in childhood might make results on age differences more conclusive. This would also allow for further examination of the development of moral identity from childhood to adolescence. Despite the fact that social desirability was controlled for, it could be the case that adolescents were reporting more moral action and authentic pride tendencies (without knowing it) than is actually the case. Authentic pride does represent a more socially desirable emotion, and therefore these items could have been chosen based on those criteria by the participants. Furthermore, all of the data in the present study is correlational and therefore no causal connections can be made.

This was also the first implementation of a newly developed valid and reliable measure of pride. Although the questionnaire was piloted with high inter-rater agreement, and was found to have high reliability in Study 2, these results should be replicated in future research. Furthermore, because this measure is newly developed replication in future studies will allow for fine-tuning of the measure, scenarios, and items. In addition, although it is the most widely used, the moral identity measure developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) is not the only resource available for quantifying moral identity. Other measures, such as the Good Self Interview (Arnold, 1993) and Moral Self Relevance (Barriga et. al, 2001) that focus on the importance that

individuals place on certain moral (and non-moral) qualities (e.g. honest, considerate, outgoing, funny) would have also been sufficient for use in this study. However, as mentioned earlier, moral identity may not be one-dimensional. There appears to be two different types of moral identity: one based on personally important and internal values, and one focussed more on social identity and external cues. Currently, no measure exists that identifies or differentiates between these two moral identity dimensions. The moral identity measure by Aquino and Reed (2002) simply differentiates between two different ‘components’ of moral identity: internalization and symbolization. However, based on the results from Study 2, it might be the case that there exists two completely different forms of moral identity: internalization, which is associated with internal moral motivation and authentic pride (genuine self-esteem, positive personality traits), and symbolization, which is related to external motivation and hubristic pride (fragile self-esteem, narcissism). Just as the two facets of pride are important to differentiate, it may be important to begin to distinguish between two different types of moral identity (internalization versus symbolization) when investigating moral identity development and moral behaviour. Future studies must take this into consideration and moral identity measures need to be revised in order to account for this variability. A more in-depth measure of moral identity might make for stronger results in future studies.

Future research needs to focus on the findings pertaining to the absence of internal moral motivation without authentic pride. As previously mentioned, these findings suggest that being high on hubristic pride (while controlling for authentic pride) is not related to internal moral motivation. Future studies need to delve into the reasons for this in order to understand the potential ‘dark side’ of moral identity. Researchers need to examine how to increase internal moral motivation without simultaneously supporting external moral motivation and undermining

pre-existing internal motivation. Krettenauer (2011) found that the relationship between moral centrality and moral motivation becomes consistent over time. Specifically, external moral motivation, internal moral motivation, and moral centrality showed a stronger association during the adolescent age period (meaning these constructs were less consistent and pertinent in late childhood/early adolescence). Thus, incorporating these strategies on how to increase internal moral motivation would be the most effective during the adolescent age period. Information on how to increase internal motivation would be helpful in the workplace, schools, and everyday life in order to *maintain* moral action. Research should aim at extending what has been presented in the current study. Much of the current research on moral identity, moral behaviour, and moral emotions solely focusses on the role of negative moral emotions. Future research should continue to consider the role that positive moral emotions play in motivating moral behaviour, as well as moderating the relationship between moral standards and moral action.

In this study, the positive moral emotion of pride (authentic and hubristic) was examined as both a motivational tool and an important factor in adolescent moral identity development. The overarching goals were, first, to create a standardized measure to examine and differentiate between the two facets of pride (Study 1) and, second, to determine the role that pride plays in moral identity development and predicting reported moral behaviour (Study 2). The analyses of the two facets of pride supported the original proposed relationship among these variables, in that there exists a strong relationship among all of the genuine, internal variables (moral identity internalization, internal moral motivation, authentic pride) and the external, social-acceptance driven factors (moral identity symbolization, external moral motivation, hubristic pride). However, future research needs to consider the existence of two different forms of moral identity (internalization versus symbolization) and measure these facets separately when investigating

moral identity development in the future. Examining and distinguishing between these two facets of pride and moral identity might begin to change the way we understand moral identity development and moral action in the future.

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TablesTable 1. *The differences between authentic and hubristic pride*

Authentic Pride	Hubristic Pride
Associated with words like “confident” and “accomplished” Context-specific	Associated with words like “conceited” and “arrogant” Global self-representations
Positively related to agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness	Negatively related to agreeableness and conscientiousness; positively related to narcissism
Genuine self-esteem (socially acceptable, achievement oriented) Related to guilt	Fragile self-esteem (narcissistic, related to arrogance) Related to shame

Table 2. *Factor analysis for authentic and hubristic pride items*

	1	2	Cronbach's Alpha
A6: opportunity to do good/right	.93	.11	
A1: positive consequences for others	.92	.07	
A4: making the right decision	.91	.11	.92
A2: evaluation of action as good/right	.91	.12	
A3: moral luck (being there at the right time)	.87	.13	
A5: normativity of behaviour	.55	.08	
H1: being more virtuous than others	.08	.90	
H3: being superior/standing out	-.03	.86	
H4: being praiseworthy	.29	.85	.89
H2: leaving good impressions on others	.12	.82	
H5: non-normativity of behaviour	.05	.70	
H6: consistency of behaviour	.52	.61	

Table 3. *Means and standard deviations for pride, guilt, shame, narcissism, moral identity, moral motivation, social desirability bias, and SES*

	M	SD
Authentic pride	4.11	.43
Hubristic pride	3.01	.65
Guilt	3.92	.62
Shame	3.08	.62
Narcissism	.28	.20
Moral identity: internalization	4.38	.59
Moral identity: symbolization	3.09	.74
Moral motivation: internal	4.13	.63
Moral motivation: external	3.78	.63
Social desirability bias	.53	.20
SES	51.13	14.46

Table 4. *Bivariate correlations among pride, shame, guilt, narcissism, and age*

	AP	HP	Shame	Guilt	NAR	Age
1. Authentic Pride	-	.43**	.26**	.66**	-.00	.01
2. Hubristic Pride		-	.25**	.27**	.32**	.05
3. Shame			-	.55**	-.25**	-.15*
4. Guilt				-	-.30**	-.06
5. Narcissism					-	.14
6. Age						-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5. *Partial correlations among pride, shame, guilt, narcissism, and age*

Control Variable		1	2	3	4	5
Authentic Pride	1. Hubristic pride	-	.15*	-.03	.36**	.05
	2. Shame		-	.52**	-.26**	-.16*
	3. Guilt			-	-.40**	-.09
	4. Narcissism				-	.14
	5. Age					-
Hubristic Pride	1. Authentic pride	-	.18*	.63**	-.17*	-.01
	2. Shame		-	.52**	-.36**	-.17*
	3. Guilt			-	-.43**	-.08
	4. Narcissism				-	.13
	5. Age					-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6. *Bivariate correlations among pride, moral identity, and age*

	AP	HP	MI-I	MI-S	Age
1. Authentic Pride	-	.43**	.60**	.34**	.01
2. Hubristic Pride		-	.12	.44**	.05
3. Moral identity: internalization			-	.28**	.08
4. Moral identity: symbolization				-	-.10
5. Age					-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 7. *Partial correlations among pride, moral identity, and age*

Control Variable		1	2	3	4
Authentic Pride	1. Hubristic pride	-	-.19**	.34**	.05
	2. Moral identity: internalization		-	.10	.10
	3. Moral identity: symbolization			-	-.11
	4. Age				-
Hubristic Pride	1. Authentic pride	-	.61**	.19**	-.01
	2. Moral identity: internalization		-	.25**	.08
	3. Moral identity: symbolization			-	-.13
	4. Age				-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 8. *Bivariate correlations among pride, moral motivation, and age*

	AP	HP	MM-I	MM-E	Age
1. Authentic pride	-	-	.66**	.38**	.01
2. Hubristic Pride		-	.30**	.43**	.05
3. Internal moral motivation			-	.51**	.06
4. External moral motivation				-	-.01
5. Age					-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 9. *Partial correlations among pride, moral motivation, and age*

Control Variable		1	2	3	4
Authentic Pride	1. Hubristic pride	-	.02	.32**	.05
	2. Internal moral motivation		-	.38**	.07
	3. External moral motivation			-	-.01
	4. Age				-
Hubristic Pride	1. Authentic pride	-	.62**	.23**	-.01
	2. Internal moral motivation		-	.45**	.04
	3. External moral motivation			-	-.03
	4. Age				-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 10. *Hierarchical regression predicting authentic pride*

		β	t	ΔR^2
Step 1	Hubristic pride	.29	6.96**	.29
	Gender	.21	4.21**	
	Social desirability bias	.46	3.54	
Step 2	Hubristic pride	.19	5.18**	.31**
	Gender	-.01	-.11	
	Social desirability bias	.08	.78	
	Moral identity: internalization	.27	6.50**	
	Moral identity: symbolization	-.01	-.40	
	External moral motivation	-.03	-.66	
	Internal moral motivation	.26	5.30**	

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 11. *Hierarchical regression for predicting hubristic pride*

		β	t	ΔR^2
Step 1	Authentic pride	.68	6.96**	.22
	Gender	-.21	-2.58	
	Social desirability bias	.18	.85	
Step 2	Authentic pride	.61	5.18**	.21**
	Gender	-.22	-2.96**	
	Social desirability bias	.04	.21	
	Moral identity: internalization	-.22	-2.75**	
	Moral identity: symbolization	.30	5.70**	
	External moral motivation	.32	4.95**	
	Internal moral motivation	-.07	-.80	

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 12. *Pride differences between high school and university students*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Authentic pride	High school	4.15	.41	1.21	214
	University	4.08	.44		
Hubristic pride	High school	3.03	.61	-.89	214
	University	3.11	.68		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 13. *Moral identity differences between high school and university students*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Moral identity: internalization	High school	4.36	.57	-.52	214
	University	4.40	.61		
Moral identity: symbolization	High school	3.17	.68	1.51	214
	University	3.02	.77		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 14. *Moral motivation differences between high school and university students*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Moral motivation: internal	High school	4.12	.58	-.43	214
	University	4.14	.66		
Moral motivation: external	High school	3.79	.62	.38	214
	University	3.76	.63		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 15. *Differences in narcissism between high school and university students*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Narcissism	High School	.24	.18	-3.01**	211
	University	.32	.20		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 16. *Differences in moral identity between males and females*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Moral identity: internalization	Male	4.22	.64	-4.06**	213
	Female	4.54	.50		
Moral identity: symbolization	Male	2.99	.70	-1.95*	213
	Female	3.18	.77		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 17. *Differences in pride between males and females*


		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Authentic pride	Male	4.03	.41	-2.92**	213
	Female	4.20	.44		
Hubristic pride	Male	3.14	.64	1.56	213
	Female	3.01	.65		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 18. *Differences in moral motivation between males and females*

		M	SD	<i>t</i>	DF
Moral motivation: internal	Male	3.88	.65	-6.04**	213
	Female	4.36	.50		
Moral motivation: external	Male	3.66	.60	-2.67**	213
	Female	3.89	.64		

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

FiguresFigure 1. *Proposed relationship among moral identity, moral motivation, and moral emotions*

Appendix

How You Think and Feel

On the following pages you find descriptions of a variety of situations. After each situation, you will see statements that describe ways how people might think and feel.

Please read each story carefully. Imagine how you would feel about yourself in this situation. Circle the corresponding number on the scale that goes from 1 = very bad to 7 = very good.

In the next step, read all statements that explain why you would feel good or bad about yourself in this situation. Rate each statement how likely it is that you think this way.

Example

You have taken Psychology 102 this term. It is one of your favourite courses. You want to achieve an outstanding mark for this course and therefore study really hard for the final exam. As a consequence, you got an A+ for the exam.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I received the mark I deserved. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
It was an easy exam. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I had good luck. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am a very capable student. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
When I study hard, I can excel as a student. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

**Please keep in mind, there are no right or wrong answers to the questions.
Just indicate what you personally think and feel.**

Please do not skip any questions or pages.

While you are walking home from school one day, you see the wallet of the man walking in front of you fall out of his pocket. You consider checking to see if there is any money in the wallet that you could take. However, you decide to pick up the wallet and run it back to the man without looking inside.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
Others will admire me for doing this. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did something good. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am a highly honourable person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am perfect. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others would have taken the money from the wallet. --	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I helped the man. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I was able to make the right decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I was in the position to return the wallet. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would expect everyone to return the wallet. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I had the opportunity to make someone else feel good.	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more honest than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You are taking care of your friend's dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog runs away.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I feel irresponsible and incompetent. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I vow to be more careful next time -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would think my friend could just get a new dog. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While playing around on the schoolyard, you throw a ball and it hits one of your classmates right in the face.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I would feel stupid that I can't even throw a ball. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
It was just an accident. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would apologize and make sure my classmate is not hurt. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While you are strolling through a store that sells perfume you see a man drop an expensive bottle of cologne. The bottle breaks on the floor. The manager comes and insists that whoever dropped it must pay for it. The man blames it on a young child standing next to him, whose mother will have to pay for it. You decide to approach the manager and tell him that you saw the man drop the bottle. The man ends up having to pay for the broken bottle.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am a highly courageous person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I actually saw the man drop the bottle. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more courageous than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone would do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am outstanding. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made sure that the child would not be punished unfairly. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I stood up for someone else. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others would think of me as an exemplar. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I took the opportunity to help the young child and the mother. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what others would not have done. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

Imagine, one day you were waiting in a line to see your favourite musical group. There was just one teenager ahead of you when you heard the ticket seller say that there is only one ticket left. The ticket seller was in a small booth and couldn't see very well. Although you could have pushed the teenager ahead of you out of the way, you decide not to. The person in front of you ends up getting the last ticket.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am extremely good. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I resisted the temptation to get the ticket. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did the right thing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone would do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others would have pushed the teenager out of their way. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am pleased with my decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am glad that I did not take advantage of this situation.	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Even though I could have gotten the ticket, I did not do it. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I have much better self-control than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more considerate than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others would think of me as a very considerate person.	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While taking a toy off the shelf in a department store you break it.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
This makes me nervous – I need to make up for it. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I avoid going to the store for a while. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
It was only an accident - A lot of things these days are poor quality. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

Imagine that you had to complete a group project at school. You make a mistake on the project, but one of your classmates gets blamed for the error. You decide not to say anything to the teacher and let your classmate take the fall.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
Life isn't always fair. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I keep quiet and avoid the classmate for a while. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would feel bad and want to correct the situation. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While you are strolling through a small store, you see a product that you would really like to have. However, you cannot afford to buy it. As no one is watching you, you consider taking the object without paying. However, you decide *not* to take the product and leave the store empty handed.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am glad that I did not make this mistake. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am pleased with my decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I resisted the temptation to take what I really liked. ---	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Even though I could easily have gotten away with taking the object, I did not do it. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
If others had seen me, they would have thought of me as an extremely honest person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am a person of high integrity. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I have more will-power than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone is expected to do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Anyone else definitely would have taken the object. --	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did the right thing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am never weak. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You went on Facebook the other day and notice that some of your classmates are posting mean comments about one student in your class. You make the decision to tell your teacher at school and as a result the cyber bullying of this student stops.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I did what everyone would be expected to do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others think of me as a highly moral person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more caring than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did the right thing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I had the opportunity to stop someone from being bullied. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what others would not have done. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I stand out. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am glad that I could do something about the bullying. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision to tell the teacher. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I helped the student. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am always considerate. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You volunteer to help at a summer camp for autistic children. It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. So you quit.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I feel selfish and think I am basically lazy. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I should be more concerned about people who are less fortunate. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
They sure will find a replacement for me. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While you are riding on the bus you notice a group of youngsters in the back bullying another kid. The bus driver seems to be too busy to realize what is happening. At the next stop, you decide to tell the driver what is going on at the back of the bus. The driver intervenes and the youngsters are made to sit at the front of the bus for the rest of the year.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am a highly courageous person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others would think of me as a hero. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I cared for the kid who was bullied. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am lucky that I happened to see what was going on in the back of the bus. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am outstanding. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I took the opportunity to help the victim. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
What I did, is morally right. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision to tell the bus driver. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am braver than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what others would not have done. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone is expected to do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You are asked to donate money for families who cannot afford medical treatment for their children. You decide not give anything because you need all your money for a trip you want to do with your friends over the next weekend.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
Eventually these families will get the help they need. -	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I feel selfish and inconsiderate. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I vow to donate money next time. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You have a math assignment to hand in tomorrow but you have difficulties to get started. You see you classmate has already finished his assignment. For a moment, when she is going to the bathroom you copy her answers. The next day you hand these answers in.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am a worthless cheater. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I wonder how I can make up for this mistake. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am pretty sure that no one will notice that I copied the answers. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While you are strolling through a flea market you observe somebody stealing a valuable object from one of the sales booths. You tell the vendor about the incident and the vendor immediately contacts security in order to pursue the thief.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
If I tell others what happened, they would think of me as a role model. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision in this situation. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did the right thing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am extremely honourable. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I helped the vendor. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone would do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I stood out in this situation. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more courageous than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I had the opportunity to prevent someone from stealing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I was in the right place at the right time. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others wouldn't have had the guts to tell the vendor. --	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

One morning, on the way to school, you see an old lady who has dropped her cane and fallen down. You don't know the lady personally but you recognize her as someone living nearby in an apartment building. Helping the woman will make you late for today's class. Still, you walk over to check if the woman is okay and offer your help.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
Others will think of me as a caring exemplar. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what everyone would do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I stand out. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did what others would have failed to do. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am always compassionate, kind and helpful. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I had the opportunity to help. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I helped the woman. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I was in the position to offer my help to the woman.	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more caring than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did a good deed. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You go for a swim in the public pool. In the dressing area you pass by an open locker with a very nice jacket hanging inside. It's the kind of jacket you always wanted to have but could not afford to buy. Nobody is around. So you take it and put it in your locker.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
People should take better care of their belongings. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I wonder whether I should bring the jacket to the lost and found. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am no good. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I am terrible. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I could not do anything about it - It was an accident. --	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I should have been more alert driving down the road. -	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

It is the end of the school year and you have a big project due tomorrow that you haven't started. Your older sibling had to do the same assignment the year before. Your older sibling still has this assignment and would let you take it, put your name on it, and hand it in. However, you decide to do your own work and stay up all night finishing your project.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I resisted the temptation to cheat. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would expect everyone not to cheat in this situation.	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am pleased with my decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
If my teachers knew, they would think of me as a role model for others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am extremely fair. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am glad that I did not take advantage of the fact that my sibling had completed this assignment before. ----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am always hard-working. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Taking my sibling's exam would have been unfair to other students. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I didn't do what many others would have done (cheat).	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Even though I could have taken the easy way out, I did not do it. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more diligent than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I always know what is right and wrong. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

Some students from your school ask you to donate money to charity. You think that they really pursue a good cause. You donate even though you had already made plans to spend the money another way.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
I did what I think everyone would do.-----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I contributed to a good cause. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
Others will think of me as a kind person. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I do more good than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am highly generous. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I made the right decision. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am glad that I had the opportunity to help. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I was in a position to help. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I did a good thing. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am more giving than others. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I am outstanding. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

While out with a group of friends, you start to make fun of a friend who's not there.

How would you feel about yourself in this situation?

Very bad 1 ----- 2 ----- 3 ----- 4 ----- 5 ----- 6 ----- 7 Very good

Why would you feel good (or bad) about yourself in this situation?

	I will think this way				
	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Maybe	Likely	Very likely
It was all in fun; it's harmless. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would feel small like a rat. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ
I would like to apologize and start talking about that person's good points. -----	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ	ρ

